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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Zoning Ordinances-Estoppel of Municipality to Enforce
The City of Raleigh had allowed the defendant to conduct a business
in her home (located in a residential zone) for a long period of time.
Although the building inspector had issued four different permits for
improvements or additions with the knowledge that the zoning ordinance
was not being observed and that the tax collector had collected a privi-
lege license tax (bakery) for eight years, the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that the city was not estopped to enforce its zoning ordinance,
and sustained an injunction requiring the defendant to conform.'
In enacting and enforcing zoning ordinances, the municipality is
exercising the police power of the state.2 A few courts have held that
a municipality is estopped from revoking a permit issued in violation of
its zoning ordinance if the permittee has acted in good faith and has
incurred expense in reliance on the permit. For instance, one court
used language which flatly announced that the doctrine of estoppel
applied to a city in the same manner as to an individual or corporation.3
Another decided that to permit the city to revoke a permit would un-
justly and inequitably deprive the permittee of rights which the city had
granted to him.4 Some courts, faced with unique fact situations, have
held that the enforcement of the zoning law would deprive the permittee
of a vested property interest which is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.5
However, by the majority view, a municipality when exercising gov-
ernmental functions cannot be estopped from enforcing its laws by un-
authorized or illegal acts of its officers or agents.0 Every person who
obtains and expends money in reliance on a building permit issued by
an a gent, of the municipality is charged with knowledge of the zoning
tracted in the usual and ordinary course of events, which from the common ex-
perience of humanity is known to be incidental to a particular employment is an
occupational disease. . . ." Quoted with approval in Duncan v. City of Charlotte,
234 N. C. 86, 91, 66 S. E. 2d 22, 26 (1951) and McNeely v. Carolina Asbestos Co.,
206 N. C. 568, 572, 174 S. E. 509, 511 (1923).
' 
1 Raleigh v. Fisher, 232 N. C. 629, 61 S. E. 2d 897 (1950).
'Kinney v. Sutton, 230 N. C. 404, 53 S. E. 2d 306 (1949).
"RoseUthal v. Dallas, 211 S. W. 2d 279 (Texas Civ. App. 1948), 28 TExAs L.
REV. 125. (1949). -
"District of Columbia v. Cahill, 54 F. 2d 453 (D. C. Cir. 1931).
'Evansville v. Gaseteria, Inc., 51 F. 2d 232 (7th Cir. 1931), Trans-Oceanic Oil
Corp. v. Santa Barbara, 85 Cal. App. 2d 776, 194 P. 2d 148 (1948).
0 Magiuder v. Redwood City, 203 Cal. 665, 265 Pac. 806 (1928); Gordon v.Surfside, 150Fla. 614, 8 So. 2d 497 (1942) ; Lipsitz v. Parr, 164 Md. 222, 164 Atl.
743 (1933) ; S. B. Garage Corp. v. Murdock, 185 Misc. 55, 55 N. Y. S. 2d 456 (Sup.
Ct. 1945). Cf. Henderson v. Gill, 229 N. C. 313, 49 S. E. 2d 754 (1948) (state not
estopped to collect taxes); Jenkins v. Henderson, 214 N. C. 244, 199 S. E. 37(1938) (city not estopped to assert ultra vires contract was void) ; State v. Bevers,86 N. C. 588 (1882) (estoppel cannot be set up against the state, but the truth of
any transaction undertaken in its name may be shown); 23 WAsir. L. REv. 51(1948). -
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
ordinance and that the agent has no authority to disobey or disregard
it.7 A building permit which is issued in violation of the zoning ordi-
nance is void ab initio8 and there can be no property rights acquired by
making expenditures in reliance on it.o
The fact that the permittee and the municipal agent have both acted
in good faith has no bearing on the result,1 0 nor does a certification by
the proper agent that the proposed or existing structure is not in viola-
tion of the zoning regulations." A mistake of fact' 2 or an error of a
clerk' 3 in issuing a permit does not estop the municipality from later
asserting that the structure does not conform to zoning regulations.
However, the violation must be an actual one and not merely an antici-
pated one.' 4  Obviously, if there has been fraud, misrepresentation' 5
or concealment 16 in the application for the permit, the municipality is
not estopped from enforcing the zoning regulations when the truth is
discovered. A resolution by the governing body of the municipality that
it will not enforce its zoning regulations will not act to estop the munici-
pality from later enforcing the zoning laws.17 Even though the officers
of the municipality knew at the time the permit was issued that the appli-
cant intended to violate the zoning law, there is no estoppel against the
municipality.' 8 Merely because the municipality has allowed a continued
violation's or has allowed others to violate the zoning ordinance 'does
not estop it from proceeding against a particular violator.2 0
It seems to be well established in North Carolina that the payment.
7 Idaho Falls v. Grimmett, 63 Idaho 90, 117 P. 2d 461 (1941).
'Giordano v. Dumont, 137 N. J. L. 740, 61 A. 2d 245 (1948).
'S. B. Garage Corp. v. Murdock, 185 Misc. 55, 55 N. Y. S. 2d 456 (Sup. Ct.
1945).
lo W. H. Barber Co. v. Minneapolis, 227 Minn. 77, 34 N. W. 2d 710 (1948).
Lipsitz v. Parr, 164 Md. 222, 164 Atl. 743 (1933).
12 Godson v. Surfside, 150 Fla. 614, 8 So. 2d 497 (1942) (enunciates the general
rule). Contra: District of Columbia v. Cahill, 54 F. 2d 453 (D. C. Cir. 1931).
" Lipsitz v. Parr, 164 Md. 222, 164 Atl. 743 (1933).
14 Mitchell v. Barfield, 232 N. C. 325, 59 S. E. 2d 810 (1950); Pendleton v.
Columbia, 209 S. C. 394, 40 S. E. 2d 499 (1946).
1" Godson v. Surfside, 150 Fla. 614, 8 So. 2d 497 (1942).
1" Valicenti's Appeal, 298 Pa. 276, 148 Atl. 308 (1929).
2 7 Maguire v. Reardon, 41 Cal. App. 596, 183 Pac. 303 (1919), affd 255 U. S.
271 (1921) ; Snow v. Johnson, 197 Ga. 146, 28 S. E. 2d 270 (1943).
' Magruder v. Redwood City, 203 Call. 665, 265 Pac. 806 (1928).
19 Leigh v. Wichita, 148 Kan. 607, 83 P. 2d 644 (1938).
-" Valicenti's Appeal, 298 Pa. 276, 148 AtI. 308 (1929). However, in one case
where the zoning ordinance was apparently directed at a single party and where the
municipality allowed violations of a similar character by others before and after
proceeding against the defendant, the court held that it would be a denial of the
equal protection of the laws to allow the municipality to enforce the ordinance
against the defendant. Evansville v. Gaseteria, Inc., 51 F. 2d 232 (7th Cir. 1931).
Where the zoning ordinance was ambiguous and provided that the building inspec-
tor should determine whether the use conforms to the ordinance, it was held that
the municipality could not revoke a permit issued by such an agent unless his
action was clearly erroneous or without basis. Crow v. Board of Adjustment of
Iowa City, 227 Iowa 324, 288 N. W. 145 (1939), 25 IowA L. REv. 383 (1940).
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of a privilege license tax only gives authority to exercise that privilege
in a lawful manner, and that the payment of a privilege license tax will
not estop the state from prosecuting those who violate its laws.2 1
Municipalities in North Carolina are given authority by the General
Assembly to enact zoning ordinances. 22 The method of making changes
in the several zones, once established, is also set out by the statute. A
holding by the court that the municipality is estopped from enforcing
its zoning ordinance by the acts of its agents would have the effect of
allowing the zoning ordinance to be amended by circumvention. It is
submitted that the decision of the court in the principal case is sound.
ERNEST S. DELANEY, JR.
State v. Calcutt, 219 N. C. 545, 15 S. E. 2d 9 (1941) (license issued by the
state revenue department does not authorize violation of the slot machine law);
Hinkle v. Scott, 211 N. C. 680, 191 S. E. 512 (1937) (payment of state and county
license tax on slot machines would not justify the operation of those devices, if
unlawful).
-'N. C. GEN. STAT. §160-172 (1943).
